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From: Mark Osler, constituent
To: The President of the United States
Re: Solving the Clemency Crisis
I. INTRODUCTION
  Federal clemency is in crisis. As of the end of July 2019, a record num-
ber1 of unresolved petitions for pardons and commutations—a total of
13,823—had piled up in a broken system.2 The president has the power to
fix this and a duty to do so. This article sets out a simple plan for that
project, identifying the key decisions that must be made.
At stake is nothing less than a core function of the presidency, set out
in the Pardon Clause of the Constitution.3 The framers knew that criminal
law would create undue harshness and require a mechanism of balance; as
Alexander Hamilton put it, “The criminal code of every country partakes so
much of necessary severity, that without an easy access to exceptions in
favor of unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a countenance too sanguinary
and cruel.”4 That’s why they left a single prerogative of kings, the pardon
power, in the hands of the executive. Clemency is a tool fit solely to the
hand of the president, and it should again be used with principle and
intention.
I have written before about the need for clemency reform and proposed
the idea of a clemency board to replace the archaic, bureaucratic, and stulti-
fying process now used in the federal system.5 Here, though, I seek to go
beyond those general pleadings and offer a detailed plan for how clemency
can be reformed. Specifically, I set out two steps. First, the president must
reconfigure the clemency process to become efficient, effective, and free of
conflicts. Second, the president must define principles for his or her use of
clemency before embarking on the project. In the pages that follow, I set
out how both can be accomplished.
Section II will briefly describe the clemency crisis we find ourselves in
after decades of unfortunate neglect. The problem has two root causes. The
1. RJ Vogt, How Courts Could Ease the White House’s Clemency Backlog, LAW360 (Aug.
25, 2019, 8:02 PM), https://www.law360.com/access-to-justice/articles/1191991/how-courts-
could-ease-these-white-house-s-clemency-backlog.
2. Office of the Pardon Attorney, Clemency Statistics, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (last updated
Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/pardon/clemency-statistics.
3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
4. THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander Hamilton).
5. Mark Osler, Clemency as the Soul of the Constitution, 34 J.L. & POL. 131 (2019) [herein-
after Osler, Clemency as the Soul]; Rachel E. Barkow & Mark Osler, Designed to Fail: The
President’s Deference to the Department of Justice in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 59
WM. & MARY L. REV. 387 (2017) [hereinafter Barkow & Osler, Designed to Fail]; Mark Osler,
Fewer Hands, More Mercy: A Plea for a Better Federal Clemency System, 41 VT. L. REV. 465
(2017) [hereinafter Osler, Fewer Hands, More Mercy]; Rachel E. Barkow & Mark Osler, Restruc-
turing Clemency: The Cost of Ignoring Clemency and a Plan for Renewal, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1
(2015) [hereinafter Barkow & Osler, Restructuring Clemency].
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first is a process that is bogged down in bureaucracy, situated within an
intrinsically conflicted Department of Justice (hereinafter “DOJ”), and bot-
tlenecked by generalists with too many other duties. The second problem is
a consistent failure to articulate a vision for the use of the pardon power,
particularly in the early years of an administration.
Section III will turn to the first imperative in reforming clemency: re-
structuring the process. Key decision points are addressed, including the
removal of the process from the hands of the DOJ, the structure to be used,
funding, staffing, and compliance with existing law. The core recommenda-
tion is that the president create a clemency board by executive order, trans-
form the pardon attorney into the staff director for that board, and import
the pardon attorney’s staff to serve the board.
Finally, Section IV will address the second imperative: the articulation
of a clear, principled, and ambitious agenda for use of the pardon power.
Three nonexclusive models are presented: setting a numerical goal, focus-
ing on “buckets” of similar cases, and looking for a mix of characteristics
that can cross over several types of cases.
Before taking office, presidents deeply consider how they will use
their power as commander-in-chief, as leader of their party, and as the head
of government agencies that help vulnerable Americans. The president
should also take time to think of how they will act as the sole holder of the
pardon power, the forgiver-in-chief. Much of the president’s job is crucial
to the nation’s well-being; clemency, though, is a key to its soul.
II. THE CLEMENCY CRISIS
Federal clemency as it exists today is dysfunctional,6 inefficient,7 and
raises false hopes—as those with Fox News or celebrity connections get
expedited consideration while thousands who followed the proper channels
hear nothing.8 This is not just a Trump administration problem; President
Obama was stingy with mercy for almost seven years,9 and then granted
over seventeen hundred commutations and over one hundred and forty par-
don petitions in a rush over the last several months of his second term.10
This program was later criticized in an inspector general’s report as rife
6. Editorial Board, The President and His Power to Pardon, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/19/opinion/trump-pardon-conrad-black-patrick-nolan.html.
7. Tana Ganeva, Can Trump Succeed Where Obama Failed—Offering Clemency for Nonvi-
olent Offenders?, THE INTERCEPT (June 2, 2018, 1:47 PM), https://theintercept.com/2018/07/02/
alice-johnson-trump-commuted-sentence-obama.
8. Matt Gertz, The Fox News Pardon Pipeline, SALON (Apr. 23, 2018, 11:00 AM), https://
www.salon.com/2018/04/23/the-fox-news-pardon-pipeline_partner/.
9. Editorial Board, Mr. Obama’s Trickle of Mercy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2015), https://
www.nytimes.com/2015/12/31/opinion/mr-obamas-trickle-of-mercy.html.
10. The Office of the Pardon Attorney, supra note 2.
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with mismanagement.11 President George W. Bush, frustrated with the
clemency process, told aides that “this system is broken” and “doesn’t make
any sense.”12 He regretted his own treatment of the pardon power so much
that in the limousine with Barack Obama on the way to the latter’s inaugu-
ration, Bush took the opportunity to urge Obama to make a clemency plan
early and stick to it.13 Bill Clinton, of course, sullied his legacy with a last-
minute pardon of fugitive Marc Rich,14 after making no grants at all in
fiscal years 1993, 1994, 1996, and 1997.15 Before him, George H.W. Bush
set a record for inaction, granting only three commutations in his entire
four-year term.16 Things have been messy for a while.
Modern clemency seems to veer from inaction to controversy and
back. It was not always like this. For example, compared to George H.W.
Bush’s seventy-seven grants of clemency (including both pardons and com-
mutations) over four years, fellow one-term President Rutherford B. Hayes
granted over one thousand clemencies (from a much smaller group of peo-
ple convicted of federal crimes),17 Coolidge granted nearly seventeen hun-
dred clemencies over six years, and even much-maligned one-termer
Herbert Hoover granted almost twelve hundred—and none of these patterns
were atypical for the period from the Civil War to the 1980’s.18 Moreover,
through our history there were not only more grants, but they were given
more consistently over a president’s term. For example, Franklin Delano
Roosevelt granted 204 clemencies in his first year in office—more than
either Bush did during their entire time in office.19 The so-called “tradition”
of holding off on grants until near the end of a president’s last term began
with Bill Clinton.20
So, what changed? Certainly, during the past four decades the federal
prison population has exploded, sentences have become harsher,21 and pa-
11. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EVALUATION AND INSPECTIONS
DIVISION REPORT 18-04, REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT’S CLEMENCY INITIATIVE (2018).
12. Peter Baker, The Final Insult in the Bush-Cheney Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/13/magazine/the-final-insult-in-the-bush-cheney-
marriage.html.
13. GEORGE W. BUSH, DECISION POINTS 104–05 (2011).
14. Eric Lichtblau & Davan Maharaj, Clinton Pardon of Rich a Saga of Power, Money, CHI.
TRIB. (Feb. 18, 2001), https://www.chicagotribune.com/sns-clinton-pardons-analysis-story.html.
15. The Office of the Pardon Attorney, supra note 2.
16. Id.; Bush also granted seventy-four pardons, including several controversial pardons of
those involved in the Iran-Contra scandal. Andrew Glass, Bush Pardons Iran-Contra Felons, Dec.
24, 1992, POLITICO (Dec. 24, 2018, 7:21 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/12/24/bush-
pardons-iran-contra-felons-dec-24-1992-1072042.
17. Osler, Clemency as the Soul, supra note 5, at 135.
18. Id. at 136.
19. The Office of the Pardon Attorney, supra note 2.
20. Id.
21. Federal Sentencing Reform, ABA, https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy/governmental
_legislative_work/priorities_policy/criminal_justice_system_improvements/federalsentencingre
form (last visited Feb. 7, 2020).
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role was eliminated from the federal system.22 But these are things that
should raise clemency numbers, not lower them—after all, with more pris-
oners and fewer avenues of release, clemency would seem to be more rele-
vant than ever. The crucial change was a quiet evolution to a remarkably
opaque and ineffective process for considering clemency petitions, all while
modern presidents (save, briefly, for President Obama) failed to articulate
any kind of coherent vision for the use of the pardon power.23
The modern process, which goes back to decisions made in the Carter
administration,24 involves no fewer than seven discrete and sequential
steps.25 The pardon attorney’s staff review petitions and contact local prose-
cutors for their opinions.26 They then make a recommendation to the pardon
attorney,27 who makes a recommendation to an assistant to the deputy attor-
ney general (hereinafter “DAG”),28 who then sends a recommendation to
the DAG,29 who sends a recommendation to the staff of the White House
Counsel,30 who makes a recommendation to the White House Counsel, who
. . . finally . . . passes the file, with a recommendation, to the president.31
This process has three fundamental flaws. First, it is simply a need-
lessly redundant and inefficient system, problems which are compounded
by a bias towards negative decisions built into each step (after all, no one
gets in trouble when a petitioner stays in prison—the risk is in releasing
people). Second, the first four steps are within the DOJ, which carries an
inherent bias in favor of the status quo.32 Finally, the last five steps (running
through the DAG staff, the DAG, the White House Counsel staff, the White
House Counsel, and the president) are conducted by generalists with many
other duties, who understandably can see clemency decisions as a low pri-
ority. These last two problems come together most acutely in the person of
the DAG, who has a remarkable array of other tasks and an unusual level of
22. U.S. PAROLE COMM’N, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL PAROLE SYSTEM (2003), https://
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/uspc/legacy/2009/10/07/history.pdf.
23. Osler, Fewer Hands, More Mercy, supra note 5.
24. Specifically, then-Attorney General Griffin Bell delegated his role in the clemency pro-
cess to the Deputy Attorney General. Paul Rosenzweig, Reflections on the Atrophying Pardon
Power, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 593, 606 (2012).
25. Osler, Fewer Hands, More Mercy, supra note 5; Barkow & Osler, Restructuring Clem-
ency, supra note 5, at 2–3; Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Revitalizing the Clemency Process, 39 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 833, 886–88 (2016) [hereinafter Larkin, Revitalizing Clemency]; Bill Keller, The Bu-
reaucracy of Mercy, MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 14, 2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/
2015/12/13/the-bureaucracy-of-mercy.
26. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL, § 9-140.111, https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-
140000-pardon-attorney.
27. Osler, Fewer Hands, More Mercy, supra note 5, at 478–79.
28. Id. at 479–81.
29. Id. at 481–83.
30. Id. at 483.
31. Id. at 484–85.
32. Margaret Colgate Love, Justice Department Administration of the President’s Pardon
Power: A Case Study in Institutional Conflict of Interest, 47 U. TOL. L. REV. 89, 105 (2015).
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connection to local prosecutors.33 And, of course, if any one of these jobs is
vacant, the process grinds to a halt.34
In the same way that preceding presidents have failed to fix the broken
process of clemency review, they have also failed to articulate how they
intend to use the pardon power or describe the principles that will guide that
use. This may, in the end, be the greater failure. Only briefly, at the end of
President Obama’s presidency, did will, principle, and outcome even come
close to lining up.35 Given that Obama’s relative (though limited)36 success
came while using a broken system, it demonstrates the power of guiding
principles.
Federal clemency doesn’t work. The reasons it does not work are well-
known. Fortunately, the solution is not far from hand: the president needs to
create a better process for recommendations on clemency petitions, and ar-
ticulate goals and principles before that process begins to operate.
III.  A BETTER PROCESS
A. Key Elements of a Better Process
1. Placement and Structure
Among those who pay attention to such things, there is a consensus
that the clemency process must be taken out of the DOJ if it is to function
properly.37 After all, the very purpose of executive clemency is to serve as a
check on sentences that were almost always sought by prosecutors38—it
makes no sense to put this corrective power in the hands of those being
corrected. The current system not only places the evaluation process deep
within the DOJ itself but requires that “substantial consideration” be given
to the views of local prosecutors who pursued the case in the first place.39
33. Osler, Fewer Hands, More Mercy, supra note 5, at 481–83.
34. This is a central distinction between vertical (sequential) decision chains versus horizon-
tal (consensus) processes. With a sequential chain, the absence of any one decision-maker stops
the process, while boards and commissions can function in the absence of a member or two.
35. John Gramlich & Kristin Bialik, Obama Used Clemency Power More Often Than Any
President Since Truman, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/
2017/01/20/obama-used-more-clemency-power.
36. Rebecca Morin, DOJ Finds ‘Several Shortcomings’ in Obama-era Clemency Program,
POLITICO (Aug. 2, 2018, 8:49 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/08/02/obama-clemency-
program-doj-watchdog-757126.
37. Larkin, Revitalizing Clemency, supra note 25; P.S. Ruckman, Jr., Preparing the Pardon
Power for the 21st Century, 12 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 446, 471–72 (2016); Love, supra note 32, at
105; Rosenzweig, supra note 24; Evan P. Schultz, Does the Fox Control Pardons in the
Henhouse?, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 177 (2001); Charles Shanor & Marc Miller, Pardon Us: System-
atic Presidential Pardons, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 139 (2001).
38. Rachel E. Barkow, Clemency and Presidential Administration of Criminal Law, 90
N.Y.U. L. REV. 802, 832 (2015).
39. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL, § 9-140.111, https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-
140000-pardon-attorney.
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At base, there is always going to be a tension between justice, in the
sense of seeking punishment for wrongful acts (which is a large part of
what prosecutors do), and mercy (which is the moral core of clemency).
The DOJ is hard-wired towards only the first of these. Molly Gill of Fami-
lies Against Mandatory Minimums described this well:
[T]he current commutation process is dominated by a
prosecutorial perspective grounded in retributivism, which is ex-
ceptionally difficult to reconcile with executive clemency. The
Department of Justice exists to do justice and put people in
prison, not to grant them mercy and let them out. It is time to
admit that, in practice, asking any one government body to do
justice and grant mercy is just too difficult and creates an insur-
mountable conflict of interest.40
If nothing else, the current DOJ-centered process has simply failed. It
has led us to an unprecedented backlog of unresolved petitions41 and has ill-
served modern presidents who face a large prisoner population and shifting
attitudes towards criminal justice.42
Acknowledging the need to take clemency out of the DOJ is a crucial
step, but not the only one; it leaves open the question of where to put it. I
will examine three possibilities here:43 (1) giving the vice president author-
ity over the clemency process, (2) simply bringing the pardon attorney into
the White House, and (3) establishing a board or commission to oversee the
evaluation of clemency petitions.
a. Assigning Clemency to the Vice President
Paul J. Larkin, Jr., a deep thinker and research scholar at the Heritage
Foundation, has proposed that the task of evaluating clemency petitions and
making recommendations to the president should “transfer the clemency
process from the Justice Department to a new clemency office in the White
40. Molly M. Gill, Into the Bottomless Black Box: The Prisoner’s Perspective on the Com-
mutation Process, 20 FED. SENT’G REP. 16, 19 (2007).
41. Vogt, supra note 1.
42. Love, supra note 32, at 100.
43. I am setting aside for purposes of this discussion the idea of turning clemency over to the
legislature or judiciary. Either would conflict with the constitutional structure—which plainly
gives the president this power—and invite other problems. Legislative clemency works poorly in
the one state where it exists—Rhode Island; the state Senate must approve all grants of clemency,
and no grants have been made in a decade. Rhode Island Restoration of Rights, Pardon, Expunge-
ment & Sealing, RESTORATION OF RIGHTS PROJECT, https://ccresourcecenter.org/state-restoration-
profiles/rhode-island-restoration-of-rights-pardon-expungement-sealing (last updated Feb. 20,
2019). A scheme that would send clemency cases to sentencing judges would exacerbate existing
disparities, as “tough” judges refused clemency and their less-harsh colleagues granted them. This
compounding of disparity would be especially acute because the bias against clemency would
come from the same judges that likely gave long sentences in the first place. Thus, a defendant is
punished disproportionately not just once but twice for drawing a tough-on-crime judge.
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House, and should designate Vice President Mike Pence as his principal
clemency advisor.”44
Larkin argues that the vice president enjoys a measure of freedom
from the DOJ’s conflicts and “would be seen as impartial. He has no law
enforcement responsibility and so lacks an institutional conflict of inter-
est.”45 Moreover, Larkin points out, the vice president has institutional ad-
vantages—as a public leader and a constitutional officer elected for the
same term as the president—in fending off pressure on any given case from
interest groups ranging from the American Bar Association to the DOJ it-
self.46 Finally, and importantly, the vice president has (in some administra-
tions, at least)47 unparalleled access to the president. Larkin quotes Joe
Biden as describing this as the ability to be the “last guy in the room at
meetings.”48
Certainly, the Larkin proposal would be an improvement from the
sluggish status quo. It would achieve, at least, three objectives: it would
shorten the process, it would eliminate the conflict of interest that the DOJ
brings with it, and it would raise the likelihood of the clemency recom-
mender having regular access to the president. This last advantage is partic-
ularly worthwhile, since the desuetude of clemency stems from its
divestiture from a powerful official close to the president, the attorney
general.49
However, there are problems with the vice-presidential model that
make it inferior to other possible reforms. Most significantly, the vice presi-
dent often has political ambitions of their own: no fewer than eight of the
past twelve vice presidents50 have run for president themselves:51 Nixon,52
44. Paul Larkin, Reforming the Federal Clemency Process, WASH. TIMES (June 12, 2017),
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/jun/12/donald-trump-can-reform-clemency-
process.
45. Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reorganizing the Federal Clemency Process, HERITAGE FOUND., 3
(May 31, 2017), https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-05/LM-206.pdf.
46. Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reforming Federal Clemency, JEWISH POL’Y CTR. (Fall 2018), https://
www.jewishpolicycenter.org/2018/10/09/reforming-federal-clemency.
47. Mike Purdy, Three Reasons Why the Vice-Presidency Matters, PRESIDENTIAL HISTORY
(July 13, 2016), https://presidentialhistory.com/2016/07/3-reasons-the-vice-president-
matters.html.
48. Paul J. Larkin, Jr., A Proposal to Restructure the Clemency Process—the Vice President
as Head of a White House Clemency Office, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 237, 249 (2017) [herein-
after Larkin, Vice President and Clemency].
49. The line of recommendation was changed in the Carter administration, when the Attor-
ney General delegated this duty to the Deputy Attorney General. Rosenzweig, supra note 24.
50. This list does not include the current vice president, Mike Pence, whose future aspira-
tions are not known.
51. Those who did not run for president were Agnew, Rockefeller, Quayle, and Cheney. Vice
Presidents of the United States (President of the Senate), U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/
artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Vice_President.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2020).
52. Martin Weil & Eleanor Randolph, Richard M. Nixon, 37th President, Dies, WASH. POST
(Apr. 23, 1994), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/watergate/stories/
nixobit.htm.
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Johnson,53 Humphrey,54 Ford,55 Mondale,56 George H.W. Bush,57 Gore,58
and Biden.59 The frequency with which vice presidents use the job as a
launching pad to the presidency creates a real disincentive for vice presi-
dents to fairly consider clemency. After all, the vice president could pay a
political price if a commutation recipient commits further crimes, and they
will tend to avoid that risk. One of the roles of clemency advisors is to
provide political cover for the president in making risky decisions, and the
process is subverted if the advisor herself is strongly averse to that same
risk.
Another problem with using the vice president as the clemency advisor
is that the vice president may have his or her own agenda regarding clem-
ency and its employment. This disjuncture between two officials who must
collaborate could be particularly acute in relation to the (nearly inevitable)
use of the pardon power to reward supporters. Even without the vice presi-
dent in this role, we have an example in recent memory of this dynamic
creating a rift between the two officials. During the George W. Bush ad-
ministration, the former Chief of Staff to Vice President Dick Cheney,
Lewis “Scooter” Libby, was indicted, convicted, and sentenced to a two-
and-a-half year prison term for perjury and obstruction of justice.60 Presi-
dent Bush commuted the sentence, but did not grant him a pardon.61 De-
spite a constant haranguing from Cheney, Bush concluded that Libby had
committed the crimes. The final hours of the Bush presidency were con-
sumed by this conflict between the President and Cheney, who is often con-
sidered the vice president with the most influence over the president in
53. Between the death of John F. Kennedy and his own election as president, Lyndon John-
son did not have a vice president. Presidential Succession During the Johnson Administration,
LBJ LIBRARY, http://www.lbjlibrary.net/collections/quick-facts/lyndon-baines-johnson-presiden-
tial-succession.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2020).
54. Michael Brenes, The Tragedy of Hubert Humphrey, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/03/23/opinion/vietnam-hubert-humphrey.html.
55. Gerald Ford, of course, became president when he did not run (upon Nixon’s resignation)
and lost to Jimmy Carter when he did. Andrew Glass, Gerald Ford Dies at Age 93, Dec. 26, 2006,
POLITICO (Dec. 26, 2018, 5:25 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/12/26/this-day-in-polit
ics-dec-26-2006-1074185.
56. Pam Louwagie, Vice President Walter Mondale’s Influence Pervades Minnesota, Even in
His 90s, STAR TRIB. (June 11, 2019, 3:33 PM).
57. Adam Nagourney, George Bush, Who Steered Nation in Tumultuous Times, is Dead at
94, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/30/us/politics/george-hw-
bush-dies.html.
58. Frank Bruni, Save Us, Al Gore, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/11/13/opinion/al-gore-trump.html.
59. Alexander Burns & Jonathan Martin, Biden Announces 2020 Run for President, After
Months of Hesitation, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/25/us/polit
ics/joe-biden-2020-announcement.html.
60. Olivia B. Waxman, Why Scooter Libby Didn’t Get a Presidential Pardon Until Just Now,
TIME (Apr. 13, 2018), https://time.com/5239767/trump-george-w-bush-dick-cheney-scooter-libby-
pardon.
61. Id.
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American history.62 “You are leaving a good man wounded on the field of
battle,” Cheney told Bush bitterly.63 The incident left a mark; after leaving
office, their collaboration did not continue.64
Finally, the vice-presidential model suffers a drawback that already
plagues the existing system: it puts a specialized function in the hands of a
generalist. Just as the DAG and the White House counsel are hampered by
the breadth of their duties, the vice president is a generalist. While some
vice presidents were less than overwhelmed with work,65 recent holders of
the office have been quite busy with a diversity of important tasks.66 For
example, Dick Cheney reshaped national security law, initiated a secret in-
terrogation program, screened Supreme Court nominees, presided over the
budget, chose cabinet members, and revamped environmental regulations.67
His successor, Joe Biden, was tasked with implementing the Obama eco-
nomic stimulus plan, negotiating budget deals, and traveling to international
trouble zones to speak for the president.68 Given these tasks, it is easy to see
how clemency could be quickly relegated to a place of neglect. Efficiency
and effectiveness dictate that the person or body charged with this duty be
specialists, focused on the constant flow of clemency petitions.
b. Bringing the Pardon Attorney into the White House
Another option is to simply slice away all of the layers of bureaucracy
in the current process between the pardon attorney and the president—the
staff of the DAG, the DAG, the staff of the White House counsel, and the
White House counsel69—leaving the pardon attorney to report directly to
the president from an office within the White House. An alternative would
be to have the pardon attorney report to the White House counsel, which
would effectively excise two layers of bureaucracy (the DAG and her staff).
Certainly, this plan would have three key advantages: it would elimi-
nate bureaucracy, pull the process closer to the president, and eliminate the
62. Baker, supra note 12.
63. Id.
64. Philip Bump, The Bush-Cheney Marriage Ended with a Fight Over Another Man, AT-
LANTIC (Oct. 10, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/10/bush-cheney-marri
age-convenience-ended-fight-over-another-man/310111.
65. Teddy Roosevelt, for example, was so bored with the job that he thought about returning
to law school while continuing to hold the office. Jack Torry, VP, As in Very Powerful, PITT.
POST-GAZETTE (July 9, 2000), http://old.post-gazette.com/headlines/20000709veep2.asp.
66. The modern, active role of the vice president was shaped by Walter Mondale, who served
under Jimmy Carter. Mondale made the vice president an important part of the White House, a
model followed by his successors. Joel Goldstein, Why Joe Biden Was a Most Unusual—and
Effective—Vice President, WASH. POST (Jan. 18, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/01/18/why-joe-biden-was-a-most-unusual-and-effective-vice-
president.
67. Nina Totenberg, Cheney: A VP with Unprecedented Power, NPR (Jan. 15, 2009, 5:00
PM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=99422633.
68. Goldstein, supra note 66.
69. See supra Section II.
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conflicts inherent in a decision chain couched in the DOJ; all while avoid-
ing the problems of a system centered around a vice president averse to
imperiling his or her own shot at the presidency. It is certainly preferable to
the present system and has strong advantages over the vice-presidential
model.
Unfortunately, this plan would also have negatives. Most prominently,
because of the hidden nature of the pardon attorney’s work, this plan would
offer little to no political cover for the president in the event of a clemency
gone bad—it is not much of an excuse to say that one followed the advice
of an unknown advisor. The institutional weight of the pardon attorney is
also much less than that of the vice president and likely to be less than that
of a well-stocked clemency board. That means a lessened ability to fend off
influencers, and an inability to demand access to the president. Finally, it
would be tempting to put the pardon attorney, once in the White House,
under the White House Counsel. That reintroduces a level of bureaucracy
and adds another generalist with many other things to do.
c. Establishing a Clemency Board or Commission
  A third, and superior, option is to create a high-profile clemency board to
evaluate petitions and make recommendations to the president. A part-time
board would meet regularly to review petitions and decide on recommenda-
tions.70 This does not necessitate getting rid of the pardon attorney and her
staff; instead, the pardon attorney would serve as the staff director,71 and
the staff could be imported to serve the new board.
A clemency board offers an ideal fix to the vertical, sequential deci-
sion process we have by creating a horizontal, consensus-driven decision
process. To put it another way, instead of having seven people making the
same decision one after another, it would be done at once by a group of
people able to discuss the case and come to a conclusion. It also allows the
existing repetitious bureaucracy to be replaced while still ensuring that mul-
tiple people review a petition for clemency—enhancing the ability to spot
significant problems or positive attributes presented by the petitioner.
A board structure also avoids problems presented by the other two
options. Unlike the vice-presidential plan, it features decision-makers who
are unlikely to be seeking higher office and the inhibitions that brings. The
board could also contain criminal justice specialists, avoiding the trap of
implanting generalists into the decision chain. Moreover, the relationship
70. Part-time boards are ubiquitous in the states. Margaret Colgate Love, Reinvigorating the
Federal Pardon Process: What the President Can Learn from the States, 9 U. ST. THOMAS L.J.
730, 743–51 (2012).
71. A part-time board supported by a staff director managing a permanent staff is the struc-
ture employed successfully by the United States Sentencing Commission. Organization, U.S.
SENT’G COMM’N, https://www.ussc.gov/about/who-we-are/organization (last visited Jan. 27,
2020).
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between the board and the president would be limited to a single function,
meaning that conflicts would not imperil other crucial functions of
government.72
A board structure also offers advantages relative to the idea of simply
bringing the pardon attorney out of the DOJ and into the White House. A
board would offer much more effective cover to the executive for the deci-
sions that he or she makes, particularly if the members are well-known peo-
ple with strong records and expertise. For example, when establishing a
presidential clemency board to consider pardons for Vietnam-era draft
evaders and other crimes related to the war, President Gerald Ford included
figures such as former senator Charles Goodell and Notre Dame President
Father Theodore Hesburgh.73 The institutional weight of similar groups—
such as the Sentencing Commission—is predictive of the kind of status that
a clemency board could attain within the executive branch.74
Another potential strength of a specialized clemency board, again
looking to the precedent of the United States Sentencing Commission,75 is
its ability to accumulate and analyze clemency data. In particular, such a
board could provide data sets and analysis on re-entry and recidivism by
those who receive clemency—important decision-making tools that presi-
dents currently do not have. The other two alternative clemency systems
don’t lend themselves to this capability. As a generalist, the vice president
is ill-suited to supervising data collection in a field as specialized as reentry
after commutation. Importing the pardon attorney into the White House
doesn’t solve the problem, either, as the pardon attorney currently does not
serve that function and without a broader restructure of the process is un-
likely to get the resources to do so.
Though a board would likely be more expensive than the other op-
tions, it would still be revenue-positive—after all, even a dozen commuta-
tions of life sentences can produce millions of dollars in prison cost savings
72. Paul Larkin has argued that, somehow, the creation of a clemency board would be con-
fused with resuscitation of a parole system. Larkin, Vice President and Clemency, supra note 48.
Obviously, the two are quite different. Most basically, the kind of advisory board described here
would not have the independent authority to act enjoyed by parole boards—it would simply serve
to advise the president. Even if a clemency board had such authority, the overwhelming majority
of clemency petitions granted have historically been for pardons, not commutations, usually in
cases where a sentence has been completed—something very different than the parole of a sen-
tence being served. The Office of the Pardon Attorney, supra note 2.
73. PRESIDENTIAL CLEMENCY BD., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT at v, 6 (1975), https://heinon
line.org/HOL/Page.=beal.
74. Notably, the Sentencing Commission is assigned to the judicial branch, while the clem-
ency board would be firmly within the executive. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2008).
75. The Sentencing Commission makes public reports on a variety of data sets. Research,
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, https://www.ussc.gov/research (last visited Jan. 27, 2020).
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as prisoners are converted to taxpayers.76 A well-functioning clemency sys-
tem would probably be strongly revenue-positive.
It is telling that the states have overwhelmingly chosen boards or com-
missions to either make clemency decisions directly or to make recommen-
dations to a governor. Six states give a board independent authority to make
decisions, twenty states have power-sharing between a board and a gover-
nor, and eighteen more require that the governor take advice from and rely
on the investigations done by a board.77 Thus, forty-four states, left to their
own devices to come up with a workable approach to analyzing clemency
petitions, have evolved to use clemency boards.78 That is a remarkable con-
sensus. If, as Justice Brandeis put it, the states are the “laboratories” of
democracy,79 then the findings on clemency are by now obvious.80
2. Key Issues in Establishing a Clemency Board
If a board model is chosen, three crucial questions must be resolved:
the membership of the board, how to fund it, and how this board would
communicate with the president.
a. Membership of the Clemency Board
The membership of the board will be crucial to success. The president
will face the dilemmas of stocking the board with talented individuals and
determining the size of the board.
In assessing the ideal size for a federal clemency board, two examples
bear examination. The United States Sentencing Commission (when all po-
sitions are full)81 has seven members. In contrast, Gerald Ford’s Presiden-
tial Clemency Board started with nine members and then expanded to
eighteen after an overwhelming number of petitions for clemency swamped
76. The Bureau of Prisons calculates the annual cost to imprison an individual to be
$31,977.65 a year. Annual Determination of Average Cost of Incarceration, 81 Fed. Reg. 46957
(July 19, 2016). Cutting just twenty years off a life sentence thus saves over $600,000. These costs
will be fully realized only if prisons close, but that is likely to happen if prison populations con-
tinue to shrink. Nicole Lewis, The U.S. Prison Population is Shrinking, THE MARSHALL PROJECT
(Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2019/04/24/the-us-prison-population-is-
shrinking.
77. Osler, Fewer Hands, More Mercy, supra note 5, at 492.
78. Notably, one of the most successful federal clemency programs also involved the use of a
board to bypass the DOJ: President Ford’s Presidential Clemency Board, which recommended
thousands of conditional pardons relating to the Vietnam War. Id. at 496–99.
79. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
80. State systems, of course, have evolved over time to their current configuration. South
Carolina’s pardon system, for example, was revised in 1946, 1949, 1981, and 1994. Chronological
History of the Department of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services, SOUTH CAROLINA DEPART-
MENT OF PROBATION, PAROLE, AND PARDON SERVICES, https://www.dppps.sc.gov/About-PPP/
Our-History (last visited Jan. 27, 2020).
81. About the Commissioners, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, https://www.ussc.gov/commissioners
(last visited Jan. 27, 2020).
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the original group.82 This larger number allowed them to form panels of
three to four members to consider petitions, with any member having the
right to refer a case to the full board—a second-review process that was
invoked in only 5 percent of their cases.83
The Ford precedent suggests two things: a larger board can do more
work and allowing the size of the board to be flexible can accommodate
spikes in petitions without creating backlogs. This second lesson may be
particularly important. An executive order establishing the board can—and
should—only define the number of people who will initially be appointed,
without setting a number of “slots.” In other words, it should name the nine
people appointed, while reserving the ability to change the number of peo-
ple on the board going forward. This would have two positive effects. First,
it would allow the board to grow or shrink according to the volume of cases
to review. Second, it would mean that the board would never lose its power
due to lack of a quorum if the president fell behind in making
appointments.84
The board members’ term of service could either be for a term of years
or run with the president’s own term. One advantage of the latter plan
would be that because the pardon power is inevitably going to be a reflec-
tion of the president’s values, it makes sense that these advisors would be
chosen by the new executive.
And who should those nine to eighteen people be? Three imperatives
must be considered in the selection of a clemency board: diversity, exper-
tise, and representation of key stakeholders. These three factors naturally
intersect, of course, since the representation of people with different types
of expertise will naturally add to the diversity of viewpoints within the
newly formed board.
Diversity must take several meanings in this context: racial and gender
diversity, ideological diversity, and geographic diversity. Racial and gender
diversity are essential, given the racial issues85 inherent in American crimi-
nal law86 and the changing dynamics of gender (and awareness of the dy-
82. PRESIDENTIAL CLEMENCY BOARD, supra note 73, at xvii.
83. Id.
84. As of July 2, 2019, four crucial federal agencies—including the United States Sentencing
Commission—were not functioning due to the lack of a quorum. Center for Economic and Policy
Research, June Update on the State of Independent Federal Agencies, CEPR BLOG (July 2, 2019),
http://cepr.net/blogs/cepr-blog/june-update-on-the-state-of-independent-federal-agencies.
85. Reform and second-look processes like clemency have the potential to directly address
racial disparities in sentencing. For example, over 90 percent of those released from prison under
the second-look provisions of the First Step Act—all convicted of crimes related to the trafficking
of crack cocaine—were black. Michael Harriot, 91% of Inmates Freed by First Step Act Were
Black. Should We Give Republicans Credit? THE ROOT (June 10, 2019), https://www.theroot.com/
91-percent-of-inmates-freed-by-first-step-act-were-blac-1835387925.
86. For a good description of racial dynamics relating to re-entry, see generally Valerie
Schneider, The Prison to Homelessness Pipeline: Criminal Record Checks, Race, and Disparate
Impact, 93 IND. L.J. 421 (2018).
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namics of gender) within the field.87 Just as important are ideological and
party identity diversity. It is essential that reform of clemency not become a
captive of party politics.88 The statute defining the United States Sentencing
Commission accounts for this problem by requiring that no more than four
of the members of the seven person commission can be members of the
same political party.89 It would make sense to impose a similar rule on the
clemency board. Finally, geographic diversity is important because criminal
law issues (and concomitant issues like reentry) are not homogeneous
across the United States. For example, the use of enhanced sentences for
narcotics convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 851 varies widely from one part of
the country to another.90 Other significant regional variations include the
prevalence (or lack thereof) of narcotics such as methamphetamine,91 the
availability of reentry resources,92 and the presence of federal enclaves such
as Indian reservations.93
Expertise should also be a factor when choosing members of a clem-
ency board. The realities of criminal law can be both surprising and sober-
ing; it is a field strewn with tragedy and grim realities. An exposure to those
realities is important, but we should not re-create the mistake of looking
only to prosecutors (or former prosecutors) to provide that knowing eye.94
Federal defenders, probation officers, judges, reentry specialists, and those
who themselves have been incarcerated certainly have more experience
with the lives of incarcerated people once the prison doors swing shut
while, in contrast, the prosecutor’s relationship with the convicted person
expires once an appeal is concluded.95
87. Reentry issues and related problems involving reentry present differing dynamics de-
pending on gender. Megan Davidson et al., Gender-Responsiveness in Corrections: Estimating
Female Inmate Misconduct Risk Using the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI), 40 LAW &
HUMAN BEHAVIOR 72, 73 (2016).
88. Paul Larkin cites the danger of partisanship as a central potential problem were a board
system to be implemented. Larkin, Vice President and Clemency, supra note 48, at 248.
89. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2008).
90. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, APPLICATION AND IMPACT OF 21 U.S.C. § 851: ENHANCED PENAL-
TIES FOR DRUG OFFENDERS, 20–21, (2018), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-
and-publications/research-publications/2018/20180712_851-Mand-Min.pdf.
91. Amelia McDonnell-Parry, Meth is Making a Comeback Across America, ROLLING STONE
(Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-news/meth-comeback-opioid-epidem
ic-america-734097.
92. For a list or re-entry resources by state, see Re-entry Resources for Ex-Offenders by State,
HELP FOR FELONS, https://helpforfelons.org/reentry-programs-ex-offenders-state/ (last visited Feb.
7, 2020).
93. Cassidy McDonald, Drugs Were Around Me Every Day, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2016),
https://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2016/10/28/drugs-were-around-me-every-day.
94. Notably, some state boards seem to work well without requiring criminal law back-
grounds among the members. For example, South Carolina’s high-functioning board was staffed
in 2016 with a nurse, a phone company supervisor, an engineer, a retiree, a social studies teacher,
a car broker, and a fitness trainer. Osler, Fewer Hands, More Mercy, supra note 5 at 496.
95. Previously, Rachel Barkow and I suggested that such a board “should include individuals
with experience as federal defenders, judges, victims’ representatives, probation officers, and po-
lice officers, among others, to get a range of perspectives aired and discussed.” Barkow & Osler,
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Finally, tough decisions must be made regarding the representation of
key stakeholders, particularly those who have previously had control of the
process: the DOJ and the White House counsel. Certainly, it would be pos-
sible to put a representative of each on the new board, but that may not be
advisable given the institutional weight each entity bears within the White
House. A reserved seat might guarantee a degree of influence that would
undercut the independence of the body. This argument, admittedly, applies
much more to the DOJ than it would to the office of the White House
Counsel, which lacks the inherent conflict of interest that we see in the
DOJ. The United States Sentencing Commission finesses a middle ground
and gives a representative of the DOJ a seat as a nonvoting ex officio
member.96
b. Funding the Board
  As discussed previously, a clemency board would be revenue-positive for
the government as a whole, given the expected savings in incarceration
costs.97 Moreover, much of the staff expenses for the board already exist as
part of the office of the pardon attorney (which, as proposed here, would
transfer out of the DOJ). Expenses relating to the added personnel—the
board members—are limited too since the board would be part-time and
government service on the board would not be the principle source of in-
come for the board members. That said, proper funding of the board to
support a staff sufficient to both analyze petitions and collect data would be
crucial to its success. If the board was positioned within the Executive Of-
fice of the President alongside bodies like the National Security Council,
the Council of Economic Advisors, and the Office of Science and Technol-
ogy Policy,98 its funding would come from an additional line item (and a
relatively small one) in the budget for the Executive Office of the President.
c. Communication with the President
Guaranteeing access to the president would be crucial to the success of
board-based clemency reform. Quarterly meetings between the chairperson
of the board and the president would be essential. This would allow, finally,
for regularity in the announcement of clemency grants and denials and alle-
viate the modern plague of a last-minute rush as a president prepares to
leave office.
Crucial to this regularity would be the appointment of a chair who is
close to the president and bears sufficient gravitas to maintain the proper
Designed to Fail, supra note 5, at 462. We also previously argued in favor of including a previ-
ously incarcerated person. Barkow & Osler, Restructuring Clemency, supra note 5, at 21.
96. 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2008).
97. See supra Section III(A)(1)(c).
98. The Administration, THE WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-trump-adminis
tration (last visited Jan. 27, 2020).
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role of the board. While the board as a whole should not be composed of
those with ties to the president, there is value in a chair with that personal
connection.
B. How to Create This Better Structure
1. Executive Order
  The structure suggested here—a clemency board within the Executive
Office of the President—could be created without legislation.99 The current
structure, after all, is constructed through federal regulations and historical
practice and is free of legislative strictures. In fact, the Federal Advisory
Committee Act expressly recognizes that such boards can be created by the
president without legislation.100 A new process can be created through an
executive order that sweeps away the existing regulations and establishes a
new and better structure.
Currently, 28 CFR §§ 1.1–1.11 establishes the contours of the current
clemency process—in particular, the roles of the pardon attorney and the
DOJ—and would need to be revoked as part of creating a better system.101
Certain aspects of those regulations might merit consideration as part of the
new process, though. For example, 28 CFR § 1.6(b) directs the Attorney
General to solicit the views of victims where applicable—a task that can
and should be transferred to the new board. Further, 28 CFR §§ 0.35 & 0.36
would need to be revoked, as they set out the line of review within the DOJ,
beginning with the pardon attorney and ending with the DAG.
Beyond revoking the existing mechanisms, an executive order would
have to establish the new ones, including defining the size and composition
of a clemency board; establishing the relationship between that board and
the president;102 defining the meeting schedule and protocol between the
board and the president; reassigning the pardon attorney and staff to be-
99. This is one of four ways, in fact, that an advisory committee can be formed. The others
are to create a committee directly by act of Congress, through a Congressional directive to the
president asking that he form such a committee, or the president can request private citizens to
form a committee or utilize an existing advisory body. Jay S. Bybee, Advising the President:
Separation of Powers and the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 104 YALE L.J. 51, 57–58 (1994).
100. The Federal Advisory Committee Act recognizes that the president can create an advi-
sory committee without legislation. 5 U.S.C. App. 2 §§ 5(c), 9(a)(1) (2010).
101. In particular, 28 CFR § 1.1 requires that clemency petitions be submitted to the pardon
attorney, §1.6 creates review, investigation, and recommendation to the president by the attorney
general (all functions now delegated to the Deputy Attorney General), § 1.8 describes the relation-
ship between the attorney General (or designee) and the president, § 1.9 allows delegation of the
attorney general’s duties to “any officer of the Department of Justice, and § 1.11 establishes that
these regulations “are advisory only and for the internal guidance of Department of Justice
personnel.”
102. In defining the relationship between the president and the board, the executive order
might address the effect of presidential inaction on recommendations by the board. Currently, if
the president takes no action within thirty days of submission of a recommendation that a petition
be denied, the petition is deemed to be denied.
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come the staff director and staff of the board; and empowering the board to
utilize the resources of the executive branch. The last of these is especially
important because the key documents relating to a petitioner—the
presentence investigation report and the Bureau of Prison’s progress re-
port—will still be controlled by the courts and the DOJ, respectively.103
Finally, the executive order would have to set out one more thing: the
procedures that would ensure compliance with the Federal Advisory Com-
mittee Act, which sets some rules for committees that advise the president,
such as a clemency board.104
2. The Federal Advisory Committee Act & Government in the
Sunshine Act
The use of outside advisors by the president has a long history in the
United States, and advisory committees have served many prominent public
functions ranging from the investigation of President Kennedy’s death by
the Warren Commission to the evaluation of health care.105 In 1972, Con-
gress found that these advisory committees “had not been adequately re-
viewed”106 and sought to rein in and regulate these committees through the
Federal Advisory Committee Act (hereinafter “FACA”).107 The provisions
of that law entwine with the requirements of an open-meeting law, the Gov-
ernment in the Sunshine Act, which was passed in 1976.108
First things first: FACA would apply to a presidential clemency board.
On its own terms, it applies to any board or commission that is established
or utilized by the president.109 The requirements of FACA, however, are not
onerous. In summary, the statute would mandate the following restrictions
and requirements on a clemency board established by executive order:
• The board would have to file a charter.110
• Meetings of the board would have to be noticed (even for
closed meetings) in the Federal Register.111
• The board would have to issue an annual report setting forth a
summary of its activities.112
• Annual reports would need to be provided to the Library of
Congress.113
103. Provision of criminal justice records by organizations such as a clemency board is de-
fined in 5 U.S.C. § 9101 and allows for access to and use of these key records.
104. 5 U.S.C. App. 2 §§ 1–16 (2010).
105. Bybee, supra note 99, at 53–57.
106. 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 2(b)(1) (2010).
107. Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. 92-463, § 2, 86 Stat. 770 (1972).
108. Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976).
109. 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 3(2)(B).
110. Id. § 9(c). This section also sets out the information that must be included in the charter.
111. Id. § 10(a)(2).
112. Id. § 10(d). This requirement flows from the fact that the board would be exempt from
open meeting laws, discussed supra.
113. Id. § 13.
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• The president would need to re-authorize the board every two
years.114
Importantly, a clemency board would be largely exempt from open
meeting requirements. The open meeting requirements within FACA incor-
porate the exceptions included in the Government in the Sunshine Act115
and that law contains two express provisions that would apply to nearly all
of a clemency board’s work in investigating and reviewing petitions. First,
the law exempts meetings where open meeting provisions would “disclose
information of a personal nature where disclosure would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”116 Second, and perhaps even
more directive, is an exception for work that threatens to “disclose investi-
gatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes,” where such disclo-
sure would constitute an “unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” Given
that the review, investigation, and formulation of recommendations on
clemency petitions requires the constant use of presentence investigation
reports, the work of a board would seem to fit both of those exemptions.
Presentence Investigation Reports, which are prepared by probation officers
prior to sentencing,117 contain the most personal information imaginable: an
analysis of the subject’s financial condition,118 “circumstances affecting the
defendant’s behavior,”119 and psychological and medical details about the
person’s life.120
In the end, the requirements of FACA are not a reason to avoid the
board model proposed here since its requirements are not onerous and
would offer structure to the functioning of the board as it did its work.
IV. ARTICULATING A PRINCIPLED USE OF THE PARDON POWER
A. The Need to Announce Principles
Historically, presidents have had no problem promising how they
would use their other constitutional powers. President Trump, for example,
clearly explained that he would restrict immigration through harsh new tac-
tics,121 use tariffs to fight trade wars,122 and reduce America’s involvement
114. Id. § 14(a)(2).
115. 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 10(d).
116. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(6) (1992).
117. 18 U.S.C. § 3552(a) (1990).
118. FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 32(d)(2)(A)(ii).
119. Id. 32(d)(2)(A)(iii).
120. Id. 32(d)(2)(B).
121. Nick Corasaniti, A Look at Trump’s Immigration Plan, Then and Now, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
31, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/08/31/us/politics/donald-trump-immigra
tion-changes.html.
122. Michelle Fleury, Donald Trump Favours High Tariffs on Chinese Exports, BBC NEWS
(Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-35258620.
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in foreign conflicts.123 But, like everyone else who has run for president in
recent memory, he said nothing about how he would use the pardon power.
There is a cost in that continuing failure: we are deprived of the ability to
build expectations and debate the reasonableness of a plan.
Instead, presidents feel their way along and step on land mines like the
Marc Rich pardon.124 There is a better path: clearly announce the principles
that will guide your use of clemency, and the goals you will pursue. I will
describe some possibilities here. They are not exclusive of one another, of
course.
B. Reassessment of the Current Criteria
Any of the approaches described below would include a reassessment
of the current criteria, which have been defined by the DOJ, not the presi-
dent—and not surprisingly, primarily serve the institutional interests of the
DOJ.
The pardon attorney, as a part of the DOJ, finds direction in the DOJ’s
“Justice Manual,” which directs that the views of local US Attorneys (or, in
cases where main justice was the prosecutor, the assistant attorney general)
be solicited when evaluating a case, and that “The views of the United
States Attorney or Assistant Attorney General are given considerable
weight in determining what recommendations the Department should make
to the president.”125 Thus, the first criteria is to give “considerable weight”
to the views of those who chose to prosecute the case and pursue the sen-
tence given in the first place.126 This is akin to having Yankees fans pick
the Red Sox’s starting pitcher—prosecutors have no interest in seeing clem-
ency succeed, given the implied rejection of their work contained in each
grant.
123. Ben Jacobs, The Donald Trump Doctrine: ‘Assad is Bad,’ but the U.S. Must Stop ‘Na-
tion-Building’, GUARDIAN (Oct. 13, 2015, 8:34 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/
oct/13/donald-trump-foreign-policy-doctrine-nation-building.
124. The Rich pardon was so controversial that Clinton felt compelled to write an op-ed de-
fending the move, which in turn led to an extensive correction explaining that Clinton had falsely
claimed to rely on the advice of three lawyers, one of whom was Lewis “Scooter” Libby. Editor’s
Note, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/19/opinion/editors-note-
985392.html.
125. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL, § 9-140.111, https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-
140000-pardon-attorney.
126. Notably, President Ford’s Presidential Clemency Board, already outside of the Depart-
ment of Justice, avoided this kind of conflict in its own investigations, explaining that “Because
this was a program of clemency, not law enforcement, we unanimously decided not to seek the
assistance of the FBI in preparing our cases.” PRESIDENTIAL CLEMENCY BD., supra note 73, at
xvii.
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Beyond that, the manual describes a set of generally reasonable “prin-
cipal factors” that should be taken into account in considering pardons (usu-
ally after the service of a sentence),127 including:
• A five-year waiting period between release from prison and
application for a pardon,128
• Post-conviction conduct, character, and reputation,129
• Seriousness and relative recentness of the offense,130
• Acceptance of responsibility, remorse, and atonement,131 and
• Need for relief.132
In contrast, the “appropriate grounds” for considering shortening a sentence
through commutations133 include:134
• Demonstrated rehabilitation while in custody,
• The amount of time already served,
• Disparity or undue severity of sentence,
• Critical illness or old age,
• Meritorious service rendered to the government,
• Exigent circumstances unforeseen at the time of sentencing,
and
• The availability of other remedies.135
These criteria exist on paper and are both defensible and fairly broad, but do
not seem to match the reasons given for some recent grants of clemency.136
Moreover, their breadth would seem to dictate many more grants of both
pardon and commutation than are given if they were truly guiding
decisions.
127. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL, § 9-140.112, https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-
140000-pardon-attorney.
128. Id.
129. Id. § 9-140.112(A).
130. Id. § 9-140.112(B).
131. Id. § 9-140.112(C).
132. Id. § 9-140.112(D). This refers to the ability of a pardon to restore rights, including the
ability to seek certain types of employment. A fifth factor, already described here, is the views of
the local U.S. Attorney or the Assistant Attorney General. Id. § 9-140.112(E).
133. The Justice Manual also inappropriately asserts that “commutation is an extraordinary
remedy.” Id. § 9-140.113; Nothing in the Constitution or the history of clemency suggests this.
Osler, Clemency as the Soul, supra note 5, at 133–55.
134. I have re-ordered these grounds to track their analogues in consideration of pardons. U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST., JUSTICE MANUAL, § 9-140.113, https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-140000-pardon-
attorney.
135. Id.
136. For example, conservative commentator Dinesh D’Souza was pardoned by President
Trump, but hardly seemed to have demonstrated a taking of “responsibility, remorse, and atone-
ment” as he raged against his conviction even after receiving clemency. Peter Baker, Dinesh
D’Souza, Pardoned by Trump, Claims Victory Over Obama Administration, N.Y. TIMES (June 1,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/us/politics/trump-pardon-dsouza.html.
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C. Principled Approaches to Clemency
So, what else is possible? Here I suggest three constructs. The “numer-
ical goal” approach, rooted in the principle that we simply incarcerate too
many people, would establish a target number for a president’s term (or,
better, for each year of his or her term). The “bucket” approach would look
to particular injustices in the federal criminal justice scheme and target
those affected by those injustices for clemency. Finally, a “characteristic
mix” system would identify qualities in individual petitioners (regardless of
crime of conviction) that would favor them for clemency grants. With each,
separate consideration should be given to commutations and pardons since
circumstances play out differently depending on whether a sentence is
shortened or not.
1. The Numerical Goal Approach
There is political appeal, certainly, to setting a numerical goal for
clemency. Doing so, however, is in tension with setting standards for the
types of grants a president wants to make. In other words, ambitiously
promising or predicting a number of grants virtually guarantees that either
the goal will not be met or it will be difficult to consistently hew to a set of
principles or guidelines about who should receive clemency, as the out-
comes will be driven by the need to match the announced norm.
A recent example of this reveals the problem. As President Barack
Obama launched his clemency initiative in 2014, Attorney General Eric
Holder ambitiously speculated that ten thousand prisoners might be released
under the program.137 The ten thousand number—nice, round, and easily
understandable138—quickly settled into the public imagination, particularly
within prisons.139 However, it was not attached to anything, and made the
Obama efforts (which yielded about seventeen hundred commutations)
seem like a failure.140
It could be that a numerical goal is a better fit for postprison pardons
rather than commutations. A target number for pardons carries less risk and
would be easier to consistently attain.
137. Sari Horwitz, Struggling to Fix a ‘Broken’ System, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2015), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2015/12/05/holderobama.
138. Jordan Fabian, For Trump, 10,000 is His Favorite Number When Making Big Claims,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Sept. 6, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-06/trump-
has-a-favorite-number-when-he-makes-big-claims-10-000.
139. CTR. ON THE ADMIN. OF CRIMINAL L. AT NYU LAW SCHOOL, THE MERCY LOTTERY: A
REVIEW OF THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION’S CLEMENCY INITIATIVE (2018), http://www.law.
nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/The%20Mercy%20Lottery.Report%20on%20Oba
ma%20Clemency%20Initiative.2018.pdf.
140. Id.
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2. The “Bucket” Approach
Another, and better, approach is to identify “buckets” of cases which
will be the focus of clemency efforts. These buckets can serve to prioritize
the types of cases the president cares about the most. A nonexclusive list of
potential buckets for commutations would target sentences that don’t match
the nation’s sense of justice—often because attitudes and laws have
changed without retroactive effect. These buckets could include those serv-
ing sentences for marijuana offenses, older prisoners unlikely to reoffend,
crack cases that were not reached by prior initiatives, those whose cases
were under statutes altered by the First Step Act (without retroactive effect),
those who were impacted by overuse of enhanced drug sentences through
21 U.S.C. § 851 notices,141 those given a long sentence under conspiracy
rules where they were not a leader of the organization, and sex trafficking
defendants who themselves were the victims of sex trafficking.
Buckets for pardons may be more difficult to define, and it is less
important that they be defined since the connection between unjust
sentences and clemency is disconnected in pardon cases (since almost al-
ways the sentence has been completed). Certainly, categories of crime that
are no longer crimes within the community supposedly victimized (for ex-
ample, marijuana convictions where marijuana has been legalized under
state law) would be an obvious bucket for pardons.
Importantly, a bucket approach can’t be the entirety of the clemency
process, as there will always be strong cases that do not fit into a defined
bucket. However, it can focus efforts on those cases with the best chance of
success while publicly reflecting the executive’s most deeply held beliefs
about justice.
3. The “Characteristic Mix” Approach
Finally, a president could charge the clemency board to look for a mix
of characteristics in petitioners that would favor particular values. For ex-
ample, exemplary rehabilitation could be a favored basis, regardless of the
crime of conviction. This would have the advantage of breaking down some
of the “red lines”—like conviction for a crime characterized as “violent”—
that can bar truly rehabilitated prisoners from consideration for clemency.
Again, the Obama clemency initiative offers a cautionary tale. There,
the DOJ announced eight characteristics that it supposedly required: (1) the
petitioner likely would have received a lower sentence under current law;
(2) the petitioner was a non-violent offender; (3) the petitioner was a low-
level offender; (4) the petitioner did not have significant ties to large scale
criminal organizations, gangs, or cartels; (5) the petitioner had completed
141. These enhancements, which have a profound effect on sentences, vary widely in their use
from one district to another. A striking analysis of this was provided by Judge Mark Bennett in
United States v. Young, 960 F. Supp. 2d 881 (N.D. Iowa 2013).
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ten years of the sentence; (6) the petitioner did not have a significant crimi-
nal history; (7) the petitioner had demonstrated good conduct in prison; and
(8) the petitioner had no history of violence.142 Despite its seeming rational-
ity, this list was fatally flawed. Its requirements ruled out many good candi-
dates (for example, exemplary candidates with a single violent prior
offense), and didn’t reveal what turned out to be the true underlying interest
of the project: to address narcotics sentences that were too long.143 After all,
the criteria themselves facially applied to child porn cases, fraud, or human
trafficking as much as they did to narcotics. In the end, the grants did not fit
the criteria. According to a Sentencing Commission analysis, only about 5.1
percent of those granted a commutation actually met all of the criteria,
while only about 5.3 percent of narcotics defendants who did meet the crite-
ria actually got a commutation.144 The lesson from the Obama experience
should be that if key characteristics are going to set the targets for commu-
tations or pardons, they need to be simple, limited, and reflect the true in-
tent of the administration.
V. CONCLUSION
Clemency is in crisis, with thousands of petitions piled up somewhere
in the executive branch. For the past four decades, it has not functioned
consistently as a principle-driven exercise of a constitutional power. In that
failure is a betrayal not only of a function that the framers intended to exist,
but a value—mercy—which is central to our society. To create a lasting
solution, the president should create a clemency board, remove the process
from the DOJ, and announce clear principles that will guide the use of the
pardon power. Doing so will revive a crucial constitutional tool and create a
legacy that extends beyond the term of the new system’s creator.
142. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 11.
143. Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates described the legacy of the project as “restoring
proportionality to unnecessarily long drug sentences,” for example. Sari Horwitz, Obama Grants
Final 330 Commutations to Nonviolent Drug Offenders, WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-grants-final-330-commutations-to-non
violent-drug-offenders/2017/01/19/41506468-de5d-11e6-918c-99ede3c8cafa_story.html.
144. An Analysis of the Implementation of the 2014 Clemency Initiative, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N
(Sept. 2017), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publi
cations/2017/20170901_clemency.pdf.
